Microsoft's decision to retire SMS and voice for MFA in Entra ID is the right one. These codes can be phished and intercepted, and most security teams have known that for years.
The hard part is what comes after the announcement. For an organization with 5,000 employees, removing SMS means finding everyone who still depends on it, getting each of them onto something stronger and making sure nobody is locked out on the day the change lands. That isn't a setting you change once. It's a project that can take months, and in my view it's exactly the kind of work agents should be doing.
Key takeaways
- Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication will retire on February 1, 2027 for most users and on July 1, 2027 for Global Administrators and external users. Internal guest users follow the February 1 date.
- After the applicable retirement date, users whose only available MFA method is SMS or voice will receive a blocking passkey registration prompt during sign-in.
- Changing the policy takes minutes. The hard part is getting thousands of people onto a stronger method without locking anyone out.
- A workable plan has three parts: an inventory of who uses what, personal follow-up with every user, and verification before SMS is switched off.
- Offroad's agents ran this process at a customer in one week, from the initial inventory through follow-up with managers.
What is Microsoft changing, and when?
Microsoft announced on July 13, 2026 that passkeys are now the default authentication method in Entra ID and that Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication will be retired. The change covers MFA and self-service password reset. This timeline applies to Microsoft Entra ID tenants in the public cloud and GCC; other cloud environments follow a separate timeline.
Starting September 1, 2026, users enabled for SMS or voice were automatically enabled for passkeys and nudged to register during sign-in. This registration campaign prompt can be snoozed. The blocking prompt applies after the applicable retirement date to users whose only available MFA method is SMS or voice. Check message center post MC1426371 before you lock in your plan.
Why is Microsoft retiring SMS and voice MFA?
Codes sent by text message or phone call can be phished, intercepted or redirected. In Microsoft's own words, these methods "rely on shared secrets or channels that attackers increasingly intercept, phish, or manipulate." SIM swapping and real-time phishing kits make that easier every year.
Passkeys work differently. They use public-key cryptography tied to the user's device, so there's no code for an attacker to trick someone into typing on a fake page. That's why Microsoft calls them phishing-resistant by design and strongly recommends moving users to them "asap."
Why is this such a big project for large organizations?
Requiring stronger MFA is easy. Getting there is hard, because every user's situation is a little different and the work has to happen one person at a time.
- Nobody has a clean list. Admins usually don't know which users rely only on SMS, which keep SMS as a backup, and which already registered something stronger.
- Each person needs different instructions. Some can install Microsoft Authenticator, some need a passkey on their phone or laptop, and some need a hardware key such as a YubiKey.
- Some people are hard to move. Frontline staff without a company phone, contractors, people on leave and frequent travelers all need their own answer.
- The fear of lockouts is real. If dozens of people can't sign in on the morning SMS is switched off, the helpdesk and the business feel it right away.
- Follow-up never ends. Reminders get ignored, people register halfway, and someone has to chase them and loop in their managers.
None of these steps is hard on its own. The problem is doing them thousands of times, against a deadline, without losing track of anyone.
How do you move every user off SMS before the deadline?
Treat it as a rollout with clear stages rather than a policy change. This is the plan I'd recommend:
- Inventory every user's registered methods. The User registration details report in Entra ID, or
GET /reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetailsin Microsoft Graph, shows which methods each person has. Microsoft also publishes a PowerShell script that finds users who still rely on SMS or voice. - Split users into groups: SMS or voice only, SMS plus a stronger method, already on passkeys, privileged accounts and external users.
- Contact each person with instructions that match their situation, instead of one generic company-wide email.
- Set a clear deadline, such as one week, and follow up with anyone who hasn't registered yet.
- Escalate to the user's manager when reminders don't work, so nobody is surprised later.
- Verify that each person can sign in with the new method, then remove SMS and voice from your authentication methods policy.
- Handle the exceptions on purpose: hardware keys for people without smartphones, and a customer-managed telecom provider only as a last resort.
Start with privileged accounts. For admins, I'd use device-bound passkeys, such as a FIDO2 security key or Passkey in Microsoft Authenticator, and save synced passkeys for everyone else.
How did Offroad's agents do this in one week?
At a customer with 3,000 employees, our agents helped run the SMS-to-passkey rollout in one week. The goal was to move affected users to a stronger method before the deadline while avoiding sign-in disruption.
The agents mapped each user's authentication methods and identified those relying on SMS. They sent those users tailored instructions on what to set up and how to do it, with a clear deadline.
The agents tracked registration, reminded users who hadn't completed setup, and escalated outstanding cases to managers. Before the security team changed its policy, the agents verified that each user's new method worked.
The rollout took one week. The security team reviewed and approved the plan, while the agents handled the individual follow-up and kept the team informed.
This is what I mean when I say agents should carry identity work through to resolution. Finding the users who still rely on SMS is the easy part. Closing the loop with each of them is where the time goes.
Are Microsoft Authenticator push and app codes still allowed?
Yes. Authenticator push notifications and one-time codes from an authenticator app aren't part of this retirement, so users who have them won't be blocked. They still aren't phishing-resistant, because a user can be tricked into approving a prompt or typing a code into a fake page. If you're already contacting every user, it's worth moving them straight to passkeys rather than running this project twice.
Frequently asked questions
When is Microsoft retiring SMS and voice MFA?
Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication retires on February 1, 2027 for most users, including internal guest users, and on July 1, 2027 for Global Administrators and external users. Passkeys were automatically enabled for SMS- or voice-enabled users starting September 1, 2026, with a snoozable registration prompt. After the applicable retirement date, users whose only available MFA method is SMS or voice receive a blocking passkey registration prompt during sign-in. Check message center post MC1426371 for the latest dates.
What happens to users who only have SMS or voice?
After their applicable retirement date, users whose only available MFA method is SMS or voice must register a passkey during sign-in before they can continue. This blocking prompt applies from February 1, 2027 for most users, including internal guest users, and from July 1, 2027 for Global Administrators and external users.
Can we keep using SMS for MFA?
Only by contracting your own telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store, with the costs paid to that provider. Microsoft presents this as an option for regulatory, technical or business needs, not as a general fallback.
Does this affect self-service password reset?
Yes. Native SMS and voice used for self-service password reset are part of the retirement. Review SSPR alongside your MFA policy; organizations with a business, regulatory, or technical need can continue using SMS or voice through a supported provider in Microsoft Security Store.
What should replace SMS?
Microsoft recommends passkeys or another phishing-resistant method, such as Windows Hello for Business or a FIDO2 security key. Device-bound passkeys or security keys are a strong choice for privileged accounts. Choose methods that work with each user's devices, sign-in flows, and policies.
The takeaway
Microsoft has set the deadline. What's left is the operational work of moving every user, one by one, without breaking anyone's morning. That's the part I'd hand to agents, with people approving the plan and agents doing the chasing.
If you want to see how Offroad's agents could run this rollout in your environment, book a demo.
Related reading
- Safe Identity Remediation: Why Recovery Must Begin Before the Change
- Why Identity Security Needs AI Agents, Not More Dashboards
- How Offroad's AI Agents Found a Critical Auth Bypass in Plane (CVE-2026-105638)
Sources
- Microsoft Security blog, July 13, 2026: Passkeys are the default authentication method in Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: Passkeys by default and retirement of Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication
- Microsoft Learn: FAQ for Microsoft-provided SMS and voice retirement
- Microsoft 365 message center post MC1426371


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